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For the research award, I would like to propose my senior thesis. To provide some
context on my project, my thesis involves a well-known paradigm in cognitive science called the
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI). First studied by Botvonik and Cohen (1998), the paradigm follows
that multisensory integration of visuo-tactile stimuli can lead to a perceived sense of body
ownership over a non-attached body part. In the original experiment, researchers stroked a
rubber hand at the same that they stroked the participant’s human hand, leading participants to
report a sense of ownership over the rubber hand. Since the original Botvonik and Cohen
experiment, there have been many adaptations and variations of the experiment – all of which
have given researchers insight on the malleability of body representation and body ownership.
Interestingly, recent studies have begun to look at the potential power of induced body
ownership exercises in developing empathy. For my thesis, I was particularly interested in
combining the design of a study by Yuan and Steed (2010) which looked at performing induced
body ownership exercises with virtual objects and symbols in VR and Maister, Sebanz,
Knoblich, & Tsakiris (2013), a study that looked at manipulating the appearance of the rubber
hand in the RHI as a way to change implicit racial biases. My research was concerned with
studying whether experiencing virtually-induced body ownership of a racial outgroup’s hand
could have an effect on one's implicit racial biases towards that race. More information can be
found in my submitted research project document.
Background aside, this project has depended tremendously on the support of so many
individuals at the Claremont Colleges – many of whom are staffed at the library. In the early

stages of brainstorming my thesis topic last September, I met with librarian Jennifer Thompson
to discuss the types of search engines available to spark my research question in the first place.
At the time, I was entertaining a wide range of vague interests including AI, memory and
technology, and racial biases. The idea of studying racial biases and VR eventually came to me
after stumbling across a related key-word (“social cognition”) on a psych database (“PsycINFO”)
suggested to me by Jennifer. As a first-generation college student, thesis has always been an
intimidating and foreign idea to me. In the months leading up to my meeting with Jennifer, I had
struggled with finding a research question and often found myself with 20+ tabs open on my web
browser with no clue where and how to proceed. In the beginning, simply asking for help on
anything related to my thesis seemed scary because I had for so long held the perception of
theses as being huge, cumulative, academic achievements that students completed all on their
own. In my head, the independence and self-sufficiency in completing one was what made it so
monumental; however, my meeting with Jennifer, along with my later meetings with other folks
at the library, have taught me otherwise – that is, theses are indeed huge academic achievements
but they require the knowledge and support of a community.
I consider my meeting with Jennifer as a precursor to the type of collaboration and
support I’d engage in during my research. Aside from Jennifer, I also worked with Eddie Surman
and Karthik Basavanahallimanjunath from the Digital Humanities team to figure out what type
of equipment and digital resources I could use from the library to oversee my thesis. Prior to my
thesis, I hadn’t done anything in VR before so this was completely new territory for me. Not
only did working with Eddie and Karthik prove to be incredibly helpful as they were the ones to
help me learn how to use the Vive headset, but it also helped me begin to develop confidence in
pursuing my research. Because they were so eager and invested in helping me find the tools to

oversee my project, I began to feel like what I was doing was important and worth being studied.
On a less academic note, I will never forget a post-meeting conversation where Eddie, Karthik
and I casually shared our experiences of being in academia with each other. Similar to my
meeting with Jennifer, working with these two individuals last semester helped me feel less
intimidated to talk about my research and ultimately, helped me overcome my fear of asking for
help as a first-gen student.
After finalizing which equipment I’d use for my experiment last semester with Eddie and
Karthik, I also worked with Kelly Jackson and Daniel Michon. Kelly helped me coordinate with
the library staff for accessing the Vive and Professor Michon connected me to individuals at the
5Cs who assisted me in designing my virtual environment on one of the computers in the
Research Studio, as well as helped me figure out how to run my VR environment with the
particular software installed for the Vive. In relation to the physical resource that the library is in
itself, I ended up testing my participants directly in the graduate study room on the 3rd floor.
To that end, my development as a researcher has changed for the better because of the
resources provided to me by the library and the interactions I’ve had with its community. The
names above are only a few of the several contacts I communicated with during the development
of my research. Additionally, because I was in contact with so many different individuals at the
library, I was constantly giving someone new a spiel about my thesis. These seemingly small
conversations played a huge role in changing the way I talk about my work and more
importantly, the way I think about my academic worth and confidence. For these reasons, I’m
incredibly grateful for the library staff members. To reiterate what was written earlier, this
project has taught me that scholarly and academic research requires more than simply

constructing sentences on a screen or reading words on a page, but rather they also require the
support of a community.
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Abstract
Research on the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has recently begun to explore induced body
ownership exercises as a means for experimentally changing implicit social attitudes.
Similarly, recent innovations in Virtual Reality (VR) have lead researchers to begin

investigating VR as a tool for empathy training and perspective taking. The present study
addresses these two fields of research by replicating the RHI in VR, with the goal of

inducing body ownership over virtual hands of racial outgroups. A race Implicit Association
Test was administered to measure racial biases before and after the illusion. It was

predicted that participants who experienced the illusion with the virtual hand of a race

different than their own would show greater changes in performance on the post-illusion
Implicit Association Test. By and large, results did not show a significant difference

between the different hand conditions, though there was a marginally significant effect of
racial membership on the strength of ownership during the illusion. Future research

should focus on assessing pre-existing implicit attitudes, in order to clarify the question

concerning which types of people benefit the most from these body ownership exercises
that aim to change social biases.
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Introduction
Experiencing ownership over something is a fundamental part of building self-

consciousness. Accounts in induced body ownership experiments such as the widely-

studied Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) show that manipulations in visuotactile stimuli can

lead the brain to experience body ownership over external body parts. In the original RHI
experiment by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), participants observed a rubber hand being

stroked while simultaneously receiving the same tactile stimuli on their hidden left hand.
The synchronous simulation resulted in reported feelings of ownership over the rubber
hand, leading researchers to coin the phenomenon an induced body ownership illusion.

Later iterations of this experiment apply a painful “threat” stimulus (e.g. needle, syringe,

hammer) to the rubber hand after induction (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). These studies
show that people tend to have automatic visceral reactions to the threat. Other studies that

have adopted the RHI include induced ownership over non-corporeal stimuli (e.g. balloons;
Ma & Hommel, 2015), using external body parts with different physical markers (e.g.
different skin color; Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012) as stimuli, and
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performing the simulation through non-real realities (e.g. Virtual Reality; Yuan & Steed,
2010). Findings from studies in the latter two conditions -- specifically in virtual

environments, shed light on the utility of using this medium to stimulate a heightened state
of body ownership but also, raise questions on the possible applications of induced body
ownership illusions in empathy building and altering social attitudes.

While a study on the RHI in virtual reality (VR) and its impact on biases has yet to be

studied (to my knowledge), a review by Maister et al. (2015) investigates the possibility of
altering biases through real-world induced body ownership illusions. Specifically, they

propose that changes in social biases “occur via a process of self associations, first in the
physical, bodily domain as an increase in perceived physical similarity between self and
outgroup member, and then in the conceptual domain, leading to a generalization of
positive self-like associations to the outgroup” (Maister et al., 2015, p. 6). Thus,

experiencing bodily resonance with an outgroup body results in a more positive

association given to that outgroup body and more importantly, “bridges the gap between
the perceptual, bodily representations involved in body ownership, and the evaluative,
conceptual representations involved in implicit social attitudes” (p. 10).

Considering this argument, along with findings from previous induced body

ownership studies, the present study is interested in investigating the social cognitive

implications of experiencing induced body ownership through a virtual environment. It will
examine concepts and studies related to empathy, implicit biases, induced body ownership,
and virtual environments, in order to provide the necessary background for the main

research question: What effect does one’s racial ingroup identification have in inducing
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ownership of body parts that belong to a racial outgroup -- specifically, when induction is
experienced in a virtual environment?

Self Awareness & an Understanding of Others
In order to understand induced body ownership through virtual realities, it is

important to consider how one reaches an understanding and perception of oneself as a

bodily subject in the first place. Self-awareness has been characterized by some scholars as

a state in which one identifies a perceived visual stimulus as belonging to one’s own body

(Rochat, 2003; Caruthers, 2008). Indeed, this process has been observed in developmental
psychology studies -- in particular, with infants and mirror recognition tasks. For instance,
in the classic Rouge Test, an infant is marked with a red dot on their face and placed in

front of a mirror (Amsterdam, 1972). Depending on the infant’s age, along with a few other

factors, they may touch their nose after seeing the specular image of their marked red nose.

Some developmental psychologists argue that this act of recognition is a sign that the infant
has begun to register/process visual stimuli in relation to their own self (Asendorpf &

Baudonnière, 1993). The Rouge Test, along with a plethora of other mirror recognition
exercises that follow the same light support the idea that self-awareness and self-

recognition occur once the brain can identify the observed sensorimotor behavior of the

perceptual stimuli as being the same as the experienced proprioceptive signals (TajaduraJimenéz et al., 2012). In other words, one integrates the felt with the observed

sensorimotor signals. Eventually, as we age and the present cognitive functions further
develop and mature, the process of integrating the felt sensorimotor signals with the

observed sensorimotor signals is natural and performed unconsciously. While the exact age
by which infants learn to self-identify is unclear, developmental psychologists generally

EMBODYING THE OTHER IN VIRTUAL REALITY

6

agree that this process begins to take form between 18 months to 24 months (Rochat,
2003).

In relation to the present literature review’s overall question concerning the

perceptions of others in relation to oneself, it is important to then review the following

question: At what age, do we learn to develop a perception of those around us? Some child
psychologists argue that the expression of embarrassment, a common reaction to seeing

one’s reflection in the mirror for 2-year old children, is one of the first signs of an emerging
understanding of the ‘other’ (Lewis, 1992; Rochat, 2003). That is, feeling embarrassed by

one’s own reflection demonstrates that the infant possesses some low-level awareness that
they are being watched or judged by another person. Other findings from this field

demonstrate that by age 4 or 5, one’s awareness of the other develops into the ability to
infer details about the other, such as their emotionality and temperament (Callaghan &
Rochat, 2003; Rochat, 2003). In fact, the term Theory of Mind was first introduced to
explain such early developments in social cognition. The term refers to the ability to

attribute mental states to others (Wellman, 2017; Goldman, 2012). Not surprisingly, there
is evidence that suggests that this ability relates to one’s ability to selectively trust and

understand the intentionality of others’ behaviors and actions (Carlons, Koenig, & Harms,
2013).

The aforementioned question then becomes: how does the ability to acknowledge

the mental states of others develop into empathy? Given the focus of the present study, I’d
like to narrow this question even further and ask: how does empathy for people who are

racially similar to us (i.e. in-group members) differ from people who are racially dissimilar
to us (i.e. out-group members)?
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Social cognitive research looks to answer this question as it pertains to the larger

framework of body representation and self/other processing. Neurocognitive scientists

studying mirror neurons and neural empathy would argue that the ability to empathize

with someone is related to one’s mirror mechanisms (Gallese, 2010; Keysers & Gazzola,

2009). That is, when an individual observes the state, behavior, or action of someone else,

similar neurons in the individual’s brain are activated as if they too were experiencing that
same state, behavior, or action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This model of mirror

mechanisms and its potential role in empathy building is explored by Gallese (2010) in his
theory on embodied simulation. His theory follows that empathy operates through

embodied simulation which Gallese defines as the “mapping of others’ actions on the

present own motor presentations, as well as others’ emotions and sensations onto the

present own viscero-moto and somatosensory representations” (p. 82). Using findings
from mirror neuron studies, he notes that this form of simulation and embodiment is
primarily driven by the shared activation of neural substrates.

With that in mind, one could argue that VR is a type of simulated experience that

enables us to not only engage in the observational mirror neuron driven empathy, but also

perhaps more interestingly, experience a heightened state of embodiment during which we
have a much easier time mapping between self-representation and other-representation.

By that, I mean VR’s immersive features encourage users to map their self-representation
via a headset that prevents users from looking elsewhere, onto the representation of the

virtual body; thus, manipulating the boundaries between self and other. I will elaborate on
this point in a later section of this review on perspective-taking.
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As it relates to the aforementioned question of racial outgroup members, the race of

the observed other has been shown to modulate one’s shared bodily representation with

the other in the context of empathizing with their pain (Serino, Giovagnoli, Làdavas, 2009;
Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). These results led Cunnington et al. (2013) to conduct an

experiment that tested whether an assigned social category would have a similar effect in

modulating neural empathic responses to observed pain as race had in previous studies on
empathy and racial membership. In their study, Cunnington and his colleagues assigned

participants to an “own” group and an “other” group. After being informed of their group

assignments, participants were then asked to watch video clips of actors receiving a nonpainful touch or a painful touch to their cheek. While this occurred, experimenters

measured the participants’ neural responses through fMRI scanners. Consistent with

previous studies, Cunnington and his colleagues found that the greatest neural activation
occurred when participants watched racial ingroup members receive the painful touch.

More importantly, they did not find a significant neural response in participants viewing

their “own” group assignment. Altogether, these findings suggest that “race may cause an

automatic and bottom-up bias in empathic neural activation to pain” and that perhaps, we
really are “innately tuned to the perception of people who are ‘like us” (p. 9). If this is

indeed, true, there is something to be said about the present thesis experiment and its

attempt to change racial biases through multisensory simulation. Future studies would

benefit from recording participants’ implicit racial biases before and after viewing the clips,
in order to assess if the racial similarity or dissimilarity of own-group members during the

viewing task had an impact on one’s racial biases. Incorporating this addition may not seem
directly relevant to Cunnington’s original research question on empathic responses to pain,
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but as I will demonstrate in the next section, the ability to understand another’s state is
deeply tied to one’s implicit biases.

Detecting Racial Biases

The development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) by Greenwald, McGhee, and

Schwartz (1998) introduced social psychologists to quantitative metrics for capturing an
individual’s “thoughts and feelings outside of conscious awareness and control” (Project
Implicit, n.d.). Termed implicit biases, these thoughts and feelings are typically

characterized as being challenging to consciously detect due to the near impossibility of
self-reporting them. That being said, research has shown how important these invisible
biases are in the present day-to-day interactions -- namely in predicting discriminatory

behavior (Mcconnell & Leibold, 2001; Gonsalkorale et al., 2008; McConnell & Leibold, 2001,
Greenwald, 2009).

Today, the IAT is one of the most commonly used methods for measuring implicit

biases. During the test, participants complete rapid categorization tasks that involve

matching concepts and attributes to categories. In the case of the IAT for racial biases, test

takers undergo 7 blocks of categorizing words (attributes) and pictures of faces (concepts).
In the first block, they are asked to categorize faces as either belonging to a Black or Whiteidentifying individual. The second block repeats the same categorizing instructions;

however, instead of photographs as stimuli, participants are presented with adjectives and

must attribute the adjectives to either the positive or negative word list which participants
are introduced to at the beginning of the test. Each category corresponds to either a left or
right response key on the keyboard. The third block combines the Black/White concept

categorization with the positive/negative attribute categorization so that participants are
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presented with pairs of categories that share the same response key as another category
(e.g. Black and negative mapped to the left key, White and positive mapped to the right

key). Participants are again instructed to categorize the stimuli -- either a photograph or an
adjective as fast as possible.

To provide an example, a participant is currently in a block wherein Black and

negative are both assigned to the left response key. They are presented with a photograph

of a Black face. In order to give a correct response and proceed to the next trial, they would
need to press the left key since that is the corresponding response key for the category

Black during that block. In the next trial, they are then presented with an adjective from the
negative word list. Again, they would need to press the left key in this trial since negative

words are also mapped to that key.

The fourth block is identical to the third block, though only the scores from the

fourth block are used for calculating the racial bias score, unlike the first, second, and third
block -- all of which are considered practice blocks and are not included in the analysis.
Scores are determined by response times, with the argument being that the time that

someone takes to categorize the stimuli reflects the strength of their association between

the concept and the attribute. For example, someone with an implicit racial bias in favor of
White people would respond quicker to categorizing White or positive word stimuli when

these two categories share the same response key. The remaining blocks replicate the first
two blocks; albeit, slight changes are made to reverse the category pairs (e.g.

Black/negative becomes Black/positive, White/positive becomes White/negative). The
same reversal applies to the sixth and seventh block so that the initial categories that

shared the same key in the third and fourth block are swapped with the other categories.
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Previous studies have shown that there is a discrepancy between self-reported

measurements and implicit measurements (Cunningham et al., 2001; Hofmann et al.,

2005). So even if we think we aren’t consciously exercising prejudice, what happens in the

present brains to trigger these biases? Simply put, it isn’t necessarily a question of a trigger,
more so a question of an inhibition. Continuing the previous example, when the White-

preferred participant encounters a White face during a trial in which White people share

the same key response as bad words, the participant will most likely take longer to respond
than in trials in which White people share the same response key as good words. This is

largely in part due to the fact that they inhibit their automatic associations of White faces

and good words, in order to give the correct response. The inhibition, therefore, results in a
latency and more importantly, reflects the existing strength of association between certain
concepts and attributes in one’s brain. Similar to affective priming tasks wherein

participants must inhibit responses to incongruent target words, test takers must inhibit
their implicit, automatic attitudes to particular concept-attribute pairings.

On that note, there’s an ongoing debate about whether the IAT is a truly reliable

measurement for assessing the strength of one’s implicit biases. While some of the above
references have concluded that there exists a correlation between one’s IAT score and

one’s social behavior, some critics of the IAT who are more wary of these findings, argue

that there several other variables that can influence one’s performance and that the score

alone should not be the only thing to directly determine one’s level of prejudice or racism.
Some examples include: whether participants have completed a version of the IAT before
(see test-retest reliability; Cunningham et al., 2001), whether participants can simply

recognize the tested concepts and attributes (Rothermund and Wentura, 2001; see review
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by Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), and whether participants are a part of the majority or

minority group being tested (Rudmore & Ashmore, 2001). The IAT is a promising tool for
uncovering implicit attitudes under a wide umbrella of social concepts, such as race, skin

color, gender, and religion; however, as critics of the IAT have pointed out, findings should
be taken fairly lightly in terms of assessing the discriminatory tendencies of an individual
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).

In response to the discovery of implicit biases and the subsequent tests made to

detect such attitudes, there has been a sudden growth in research specifically dedicated to
investigating techniques for reducing implicit biases. One study by Inzlicht, Gutsell, and

Legault (2011) found that mimicking outgroup members lead participants to score lower
on an implicit anti-Black prejudice test. This study is relevant to the present experiment
because its findings delineate some of the mechanisms involved in changing implicit

attitudes. In their discussion, Inzlicht and his colleagues, point to the phenomenon of self-

other overlap as one possible explanation behind these changes. According to Inzlicht, the
notion of self-other overlap refers to “the overlap between one’s mental representation of

the self and the mental representations of another person or group” (2011, p. 364).

Considering this definition, Inzlicht and his colleagues call attention to studies that have
looked at prejudice reduction -- specifically, at how prejudice reduction exercises (e.g.
mimicry, manipulations to perspective-taking, increased intergroup interactions)

manipulate the overlap between one’s understanding of oneself and understanding of

others (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Phills et al., 2011). One particular study that Inzlicht
cites found that perspective-taking exercises reduced stereotyping, as well as they lead to
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an increase in self-other overlap (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault,

2011).

The idea of perspective-taking or as Inzlicht characterizes it in their paper, “putting

oneself in the shoes of another” as a method to promote self-other associations and more

importantly, reduce racial biases has been studied by other members in social psychology.
For instance, a study by Fini et al. (2013) indirectly builds upon this idea by researching a
process that they’ve identified as somatosensory resonance. According to Fini et al., this

process refers to the re-mapping of observed bodily states onto one’s own sensorimotor

system. In their study, Fini et al. delivered tactile stimuli to participants as they observed
clips of either racial ingroup or outgroup faces receiving the same tactile stimuli.

Researchers adopted the Visual Remapping of Touch1 (VRT) effect from Ladavas and

Serino (2010) to quantify feelings of somatosensory resonance. Similar to previous findings
on the racial modulation of bodily resonance, participants’ VRT effects were found to be
modulated by one’s existing implicit biases towards racial outgroup faces. Specifically,

White participants were able to experience higher somatosensory resonance (i.e. stronger
VRT effects) with Black faces after undergoing an interpersonal multisensory stimulation
(i.e. the Enfacement Illusion 2; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2013, p. 7). This change in

somatosensory resonance suggests that interactions between “low-level multisensory

integration processes,” such as the interpersonal multisensory stimulation and “higher1

This effect refers to the enhancement of one’s perception of near-threshold tactile stimuli (i.e. touch) to
one’s face when observing someone else’s face being touched (Serino & Ladavas, 2010).
2
The Enfacement Illusion is another form of induced body ownership illusion that involves experimenters
touching participants’ faces while they watch someone else’s face being touched. Similar to the RHI paradigm,
synchronous touching leads participants to develop a sense of self-identification with the other face
(Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2013)
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level representations of self and other” (e.g. racial membership) can result in the blurring
of boundaries between self and other and ingroup and outgroup membership.
Induced Body Ownership

To that end, what characteristics facilitate a successful body induction? As

highlighted in the original RHI experiment (Botvonick & Cohen, 1998), the simulation must
be administered synchronously in order for the illusion to work. The reasoning behind this
follows that the correlated visual and tactile stimuli influence the brain to match the visual
stimulation (i.e. stroking the rubber hand) with the tactile stimulation (i.e. stroking the

participant’s real hand). Thus, the multisensory integration of visuotactile stimuli develops
into a perceived sense of body ownership. Some scholars view this requirement of

synchronous visuotactile stimuli as evidence that bottom-up mechanisms drive the present
feelings of body ownership (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003).

On the other hand, other studies have challenged this notion by examining the

limitations of induction. For instance, in Tsakiris and Haggard’s study (2005), their findings
showed that the rubber hand must be positioned in the same angle as the real hand, as well
as it must possess some representational similarity with the real hand, in order for the RHI
to have an effect on participants. That is, Tsakiris and Haggard found that the RHI did not

have an effect when they replaced the rubber hand with a wooden stick. A later review by
Tsakiris (2010) developed this point further, by proposing a neurocognitive model in

which Tsakiris identified three main criteria of a successful induction: 1. The participant

has an existing association stored in the brain between the visual appearance of an object
and their physical human body, 2. the object’s postural and anatomical features are

congruent with that of a real effector; and 3. visual stimuli and tactile stimuli match
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(Tsakiris, 2010; for review see Ma & Hommell, 2015). This model, along with Tsakiris and

Haggard’s findings (2005) supports the argument that there are top-down limitations that
interfere with induction. Interestingly, in a recent study by Ma and Hommell (2015),

researchers were able to successfully induct participants’ body ownership over virtual

balloons. As they point out in their discussion, these findings do not support Tsakiris’ first

and second proposed criterions. Rather, they support the aforementioned view of bottomup processes.

In light of these findings, I hope that reviewing these two studies demonstrates to

the reader that present knowledge on the mechanisms involved in the RHI paradigm is still
very much unknown. That being said, it is an important phenomenon to study because it

gives us insight into the malleability of one’s body representation, as made apparent in the
above studies.

To that end, I would like to redirect the focus of this literature review back to

studies that have specifically researched induced body ownership and its effect on implicit
biases. The study that perhaps provides the most insight on this topic was conducted by

Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, and Tsakiris (2012). In the first part of their study, Farmer and
his colleagues manipulated the skin color of the rubber hand used in the classic RHI

paradigm, to see whether skin color of the rubber hand (i.e. white vs. black) would have an
effect on the strength of induced body ownership. They employed skin conductance
response measures, a questionnaire, and a proprioceptive drift test to assess each

participant’s strength of inducement. Additionally, they administered the race IAT on

participants before and after the simulation task to measure participants’ pre- and post-

racial biases. Collecting these metrics led them to the remarkable finding that participants
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who experienced a stronger sense of ownership over outgroup hands during the RHI ended
up scoring lower on the post-simulation IAT.

The second part of their experiment refined the design from the first experiment, in

order to ensure that the observed changes in the introspective, behavioral, and

physiological responses from the first experiment were caused specifically by the feeling of
body ownership, rather than the effect of synchronous stimulation alone. They did this by
adding a condition in which the position of the rubber hand was set up to imply either a

first-person perspective (i.e. in front of the participant) or a third-person perspective (i.e.

rotated 180° away from the participant’s real hand). Findings from this portion of the study
confirmed that the changes were being influenced by body ownership, such that

participants reported lower introspective ownership scores during the third-person
condition. Overall, this study highlights the implications of induced body ownership

illusions and hints at the potential role that strengthening ownership has in changing one’s
perception of racial outgroups.

In a nearly identical study, Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, and Tsakiris (2013)

discovered that “inducing an overlap between the bodies of self and other through illusory
ownership” leads to a reduction of negative implicit attitudes towards outgroup bodies (p.
170). The most significant difference between the two studies was that the study

conducted by Farmer et al. (2012) had a within-subjects design whereas Maister’s study
used a between-subjects design. Maister and her colleagues purposely chose a between-

subjects design because they speculated that in the previous study, participant’s ownership
over both the White and Black rubber hands between pre- and post-RHI measurements

lead to an indistinguishable effect on IAT changes. They argued that using a between-
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subjects design and more importantly, separating the induction experiences would allow
the experimenters to “separately quantify changes in attitudes towards dark skin and

changes in attitudes towards light skin” (p. 9). As demonstrated in their data, participants
did in fact show a change in implicit attitudes towards dark skin after they experienced

ownership of the dark-skinned hand, but not ownership over the light-skinned hand. That
being said, Maister and Farmer’s findings both highlight the potential implications that
come from experimentally changing self-other overlap.
Virtual Reality and Virtual Body Ownership

The use of VR technologies in empathic training has received significant attention in

the last decade. From medical trainings (Seymour et al., 2002; Stansfield et al., 2000) to

educational applications (Bailenson et al., 2008), VR has proven to be a powerful tool for

simulating immersive experiences. With the growing number of VR tools made available on
the market, researchers have been able to conduct experiments specifically looking at

induced body ownership via virtual environments. One of the first studies to do this was by
Yuan and Steed (2010). In their study, Yuan and Steed tested to see if IVR induced arm
ownership illusion existed and whether a virtual arm versus an abstract arrow cursor
would make a difference in the induction. They instructed participants to complete a

memory game adapted from Burns et al. (2005) wherein participants had to memorize

color sequences on a virtual monitor and a ball game wherein participants had to pick up a
ball from a table and drop it into a hole on the same table. During the ball game,

participants experienced a threat to their virtual arm in the form of a table lamp falling
upon their virtual hand. Lastly, they collected participants’ GSR immediately after the
threat, as well as administered a questionnaire that involved participants ranking
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statements regarding their feelings of ownership over the virtual arm after the two games.
Results indicated that the IVR induced arm ownership illusion was stronger in the virtual
arm condition (i.e. stronger subjective responses on the questionnaire and higher SCR to

the threat) than in the abstract cursor. This is consistent with some of the aforementioned
studies that suggest the importance of similarity in the visual appearance of the artificial
object and one’s self (see the Induced Body Ownership section).

On that note, the question of self-representation and virtual bodies has certainly

been reviewed by an extensive body of research. Perhaps most pertinent to my experiment
is a study by Peck et al. (2013). In this study, Peck et al. discovered that light-skinned

participants who experienced a virtual environment in a dark-skinned virtual body had

lower scores on their post-VR race IAT. As I briefly described above, VR technologies pose

the possibility for a heightened state of embodiment of the other. In Peck et al.’s study, the
embodied condition which comprised of synchronous body movements between the

virtual body and the participants’ body and a first-person perspective (e.g. participants
could look down with the headset on and see their virtual body as if they were looking

down at their own body) lead to stronger feelings of ownership in participants than in the
non-embodied condition which involved simply seeing a virtual body in the mirror.

Interestingly, Peck et al. suggest that future studies measure the length in which the lower
IAT score lasts. That aside, the study’s overall findings illustrate the empathic benefits of
simply moving in a virtual body that is different from one’s own.
The Present Study

Given these bodies of evidence, the main question that the present study seeks to

address is whether experiencing virtually-induced body ownership of a racial outgroup’s
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hands has an effect on one's implicit biases towards that racial outgroup. I hypothesize that
the use of the VR in the RHI will not only induce a sense of body ownership, as made

evident in Yuan and Steed's study (2010), but will more crucially, result in lower scores on
the race IAT, as demonstrated in Peck et al. (2013).

In order to test this hypothesis, I will compare the pre- and post-illusion IAT scores

of participants. Since previous studies on induced body ownership and implicit racial

biases have only used White participants, I hope to test this illusion on participants from a
wider range of racial backgrounds. As Maister et al. (2013) point out in the design of their

study, skin color is “a salient perceptual indicator of racial group membership”; therefore, I

have chosen to implement a similar design of testing with a Black and White virtual hand as
other skin colors may result in vaguer racial group memberships. To account for these

vague racial group memberships, I will also dedicate two questions on the post-illusion

questionnaire that will ask participants to rate their feelings of similarity or difference with
photographs of a White hand and a Black hand. These responses will help determine the
racial ingroup and outgroup status of the participant in relation to the race of the virtual

hand they saw. Based off of findings from Maister et al. (2013), I suspect that participants
will demonstrate the greatest change in post-illusion IAT performance after they’ve been
induced with a virtual hand of a different race.

Methods

Participants
Thirty-two participants (26 females, 5 male, 1 non-binary) were recruited from the

undergraduate student population at the Claremont Colleges. The average age was 20.6
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years. The self-identified racial backgrounds of the participants were as follows:

Asian/Pacific Islander (14), Latino/a (4), Black (3), White (9), and Multiracial (3). They
were compensated $10 for their participation.
Apparatus and Materials

Participants were tested in a private room at the Honnold Mudd Library. The

equipment used to perform the simulation was an HTC Vive headset, run on a Dell

Precision T5500 desktop. The simulation itself was designed and implemented in a 3D-

graphics software called Unity. In the virtual environment, there was a small room with

light blue walls and brown carpet. The room was furnished with a chair, desk, and lamp. On
the desk, there was a pair of hands and a paintbrush floating above the right hand (see

Figure 1). All of the objects in the room (with the exception of the paintbrush which was
built by Sonia Grunwald), were downloaded from Unity’s online ‘Assets’ store.

For measuring participants’ implicit racial biases, an open-source tool called IATgen

(Carpenter et al., 2018) was used to design a single-category race Implicit Association Test
(IAT), compatible with Qualtrics software. The features of the IAT were identical to the
traditional IAT by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Participants were first

presented with instructions, asking them to complete categorization tasks as quickly as

possible. The first two blocks were “practice” blocks that involved categorizing words as

having a “positive” (e.g. excitement, friend, spectacular) or “negative” (e.g. horrible, hurtful,
angry) association or categorizing images of faces as belonging to either Black or White

race. In order to make a categorization, they were required to press either the ‘E’ key for

the the left category and the ‘J’ key for the right category. The word or image was displayed
in the center of the screen and stayed there until the participant entered a response. If the
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participant entered an incorrect response, they were presented with a red ‘X’ and forced to
correct their error before they could proceed to the next trial.

Following these single category practice blocks, was a test block made up of 20

practice trials and 40 critical trials. In the stereotype-compatible test block, positive words
and White images were assigned to one key and Black images and negative words were

assigned to the other key; this forced participants to sort the image or word stimuli based

off of the stereotype that White faces elicit more positive associations and Black faces elicit
more negative associations. The stereotype-incompatible block was the reverse of this so
that Black images and positive words were assigned to one key and White images and

negative words were assigned to the other key. The order in which participants saw either
test block was randomized, thus counterbalancing the categories of words and images.

After the first test block, participants completed another sequence of two single-category
practice blocks, followed by the other test block. The test was administered through
Qualtrics on a MacBook Air 2014 laptop.

In addition to the race IAT, there was also a questionnaire administered through

Qualtrics and run on the same MacBook laptop. The first portion of the questionnaire asked
participants to rate their level of agreement towards 5 statements on a 5-point Likert scale.

The values ranged from -2 (=strongly disagree) to +2 (=strongly agree). These statements
were taken from Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris (2010) and were used to measure
participants’ introspective responses to the RHI (see Appendix A). Similar to other RHI
studies (Yuan & Steed, 2010; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James &

Fotopoulou, 2010), responses from the 5 questions were averaged to provide an

‘ownership score’ for each participant which was later used to assess the strength of the
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induction. The second part of the survey involved rating the similarity and difference

between the participant’s hand and images of a Black and White hand on another 5-point

Likert scale. The values for similarity and difference ranged from -2 (=very different) to +2
(=very similar). Following these questions were three demographic questions whereby
participants reported their self-identified race, gender, and age.
Procedure

Participants were instructed to sit at a table and complete the race IAT on a laptop.

They were given instructions on navigating the physical space with the VR headset, as well

as given general instructions on how to operate the VR headset. They were then fitted with
the HTC Vive headset. Once on, participants were given a 2 minute adjustment period in
which they were asked to look around the environment and verbally confirm to the

experimenter what they saw in the room. Afterwards, participants were asked to place

their arms on the table similar to the posture that they saw in the virtual environment (see
Figure 2). The experimenter then informed participants that they would be watching a clip
of the virtual right hand being stroked in the VR headset while the experimenter applied
strokes to their right hand with a paintbrush. Half of the participants saw a Black hand
while the other half saw a White hand. The experimenter timed the strokes to the

participant’s right hand so that tactile stimuli was synchronised as close as possible to

visual stimuli. The stimulation lasted for 2 minutes. Immediately afterwards, participants

were instructed to take off the VR headset and complete the same version of the previous
race IAT. After completing the race IAT, they were then presented with the questionnaire
that measured feelings of ownership and identification with the virtual hand, along with
their demographics. Lastly, they were debriefed and compensated by the experimenter.
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Results
IAT scores were analyzed through a web application that accompanied the same

open-source tool used to run the IAT. The web application automatically excluded

individual trials over 10,000 ms, as is common practice in the IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003).
One participant was also excluded from the analysis because more than 10% of their
response times lasted less than 300 ms. Two D-scores (pre and post induction) were

automatically calculated for each participant by the web application. The D-score is a

common effect size measure for implicit bias that involves computing the difference in

mean latency between the stereotype-compatible (White/positive, Black/negative) and
stereotype-incompatible block (Black/positive, White/negative) and dividing this
difference by the standard deviation of the latencies from both of the two blocks

(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The resulting values were scored such that more
positive D-scores (> 0) indicated a stronger preference for White faces.

First, an independent samples t-test was used to check if participants had

significantly different pre-existing racial biases. There were no significant differences in

pre-illusion IAT scores between participants in either condition of Black or White virtual

hand, t(30) = .690, p = .496. Of the pre-illusion IAT scores, 31% of participants had Dscores below zero (i.e. a stronger preference for Black faces).

For the main analysis of hand color on the participants’ pre- and post-illusion

implicit bias scores (see Table 1), a 2 (Hand color: black vs. white) x 2 (Condition: pre-

illusion vs. post-illusion) repeated measures ANOVA was run. The main effect of hand color
on induction scores was not significant, F(1, 30) = 0.02, p = .884. Additionally, results did
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not show a main effect of condition, F(1, 30) = 1.12, p = .299 nor did it show a significant
interaction between condition and hand color F(1, 30) = 1.47, p = .235.

Next, ownership scores were analyzed to determine whether hand color had an

effect on the strength of ownership that participants experienced during the induction. In
order to measure the strength of ownership, participants’ responses to the five “I”

statements were averaged, similar to what had been done in Yuan & Steed (2010). These

averages made up the participant’s ownership score and ranged between -2 (a weak sense
of ownership) and +2 (a strong sense of ownership) (see Table 2).

An independent samples t-test revealed that there was not a significant difference

in ownership scores between the two hand color conditions, t(30) = 0.72, p = .479.

Additionally, a correlation test found that ownership scores and the difference in pre- and
post-illusion IAT scores were not strongly correlated r(30) = 0.21, p = .244.

To examine whether racial congruency (i.e. identifying with the presented race of

the virtual hand or not identifying with it) might have affected the strength of ownership, a
2 (Hand color: black vs. white) x 3 (Racial identification: racially congruent, incongruent,
and equal) ANOVA was run. Racial congruency or membership was determined by the

condition that participants were in (Black or White hand) and their responses to the two
questions asking them to rate their hand’s similarity to a White hand and a Black hand.

Participants who reported feeling a greater similarity to a hand that was of the same race of
the virtual hand that they saw during their induction were grouped as “racially congruent.”
On the other hand, participants who reported feeling a greater similarity to a hand of a
different race than what they saw during their induction were grouped as “racially

incongruent.” Participants who reported finding both the images of the White hand and
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Black hand as being neither similar nor different to their hand were grouped as “equal”
(see Figure 3). Results from the ANOVA found a marginally significant effect of racial

identification, F(2, 26) = 3.24, p = .055, with those in the racially congruent group reporting,
on average, the strongest ownership scores (M = -0.23, SD = 0.27). There was no significant

effect of hand color, F(1, 26) = 2.00, p = .169 nor was there an interaction between hand
color and racial identification, F(2, 26) = .634, p = .538.
Discussion

In the present study, the Rubber Hand Illusion was performed on participants

through Virtual Reality to test whether induced body ownership of a virtual hand belonging
to a different race could change an individual’s implicit racial biases. Although findings

from previous studies have confirmed similar predictions (i.e. changes in implicit biases

can be motivated by induced body ownership exercises), the present study did not find a

significant effect of racially dissimilar body parts on changes in one’s implicit racial biases.
Considering these results, it is important to then discuss the design of this experiment and
how it differs from previous studies, in order to explain what might have led to these
findings.

To date, there have only been a handful of other studies to investigate induced body

ownership and changes in implicit biases. Specific to implicit racial biases and VR, there has
been one other study to look at these two things; albeit utilizing a full-virtual body

embodiment exercise that differed from the mechanisms of the traditional RHI (Yuan &

Steed, 2010). Interestingly, this study along with the few other studies dealing with the RHI
and racial biases had all White-identifying participants. In contrast, the present study had a
more racially diverse sample with White participants making up only 28% of the sample.
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Similar to what Maister et. al. (2013) point out in the discussion of their RHI study with allWhite participants, the effect of the IAT is generally found to be more apparent in whitemajority environments (Ashburn-Nardo & Johnson, 2008; Livingston, 2002; Richeson,
Trawalter & Shelton, 2005). Taking into consideration this effect, along with the racial

makeup of the present sample, one might speculate that the present participants may have
started with weaker racial biases than what is generally reported by other RHI studies,

dealing with implicit racial biases. To further support this speculation, a study by Farmer,

Maister, and Tsakiris (2014), found that changes between pre- and post-illusion IAT were

only significant when participants did not have an initial bias in favor of Black people. In

their study, implicit racial biases were measured through a single category variant of the
IAT, slightly different from the one used in the present sample. Additionally, scores were
counterbalanced so that scores greater than 0 indicated a more positive association of

Black people and scores less than 0 indicated a more negative association. The changes in
post-illusion scores were found to be significant only when participants’ pre-illusion IAT

scores were less than 0.07. If we assume the same trend in the present data, albeit through
an inverse scale (i.e. scores less than 0 indicate a more positive association of Black people

and scores greater than 0 indicate a more negative association of Black people) that means
only 69% of participants had an initial bias that Farmer, Maister, and Tsakiris would

consider to be strong enough to elicit a change in IAT scores. That being said, due to the
potential variability in D-score measuring algorithms between the two studies, this
comparison should be taken fairly lightly.

Something else to note about the present findings is that participants, regardless of

which condition they were in, reported weaker levels of ownership than what participants
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reported in previous non-VR RHI studies (Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013).

Because induced body ownership in VR is still very new and unknown, there is a chance
that the novelty of the virtual environment may have interfered with participants’
inductions, leading them to feel less ownership over the virtual hand than what

participants typically report feeling when experiencing induction over a real life hand. In
the future, it would be useful to implement a non-VR condition wherein researchers

perform the RHI without the virtual reality; this would help us assess whether the virtual
environment leads to a weaker or greater sense of induction.

That being said, there have been a few studies that have researched induced body

ownership (although not in relation to implicit racial bias) in a virtual environment (Yuan
& Steed, 2010; Ma & Hommel, 2013) and have been relatively successful in inducing

ownership in their participants; however, these studies utilized exercises that were far

more complex than the traditional RHI. In Yuan & Steed (2010), for example, they used two
game-like tasks and applied a threat stimuli to the virtual hand. Additionally, in the

aforementioned study by Peck et al. (2013), they had access to a full-body suit and had

instructed participants to stay in the virtual environment for at least 11.5 minutes. In line
with what was brought up in the previous paragraph, there is a possibility that the

participants in my sample may have needed a more interactive induction, as well as may
have needed a longer time to adjust to the virtual environment.

Another possible explanation for why participants may have reported such low

ownership scores is that this study’s race IAT enforced a binary of White and Black racial
membership that may have felt too limiting for participants of other races. the present

findings may have turned out differently had we tested on participants exclusively from
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either racial group, rather than from other racial groups. As described earlier, the highest
percentage of participants self-identified as Asian American/Pacific Islander (44%). In

relation to the present stimuli, participants from this background were presented with

faces that were from two racial outgroups (White and Black) during the IAT. Though some
of these participants reported finding the Black or White hand similar to their own hand,
perhaps that similarity measurement wasn’t sufficient enough to conclude a racial

identification with a skin color. That being said, we suspect that this may have also been the
reason why we ended up with a fairly high number of participants who reported feeling as
equally similar and different to the images of Black and White hands. It is possible that

these individuals could not choose one over the other; thus, opting for the equal response.
Future research on this topic would benefit from tailoring the IAT to include both a racial
ingroup and racial outgroup, depending on the reported racial identity of the participant.
Perhaps the most promising findings are those of the marginally significant effect

that was found between participants’ ownership scores and their level of similarity with a
hand of either White or Black race. This suggests that the more one identifies with the

physical appearance of a hand, the stronger they report feeling ownership over a virtual
version of it. More related to the aforementioned marginally significant effect, having a

more racialized body part such as a virtual face as stimuli could lead to stronger findings, in
that it could clarify what the parameters of similarity (i.e. do individuals find the shape of a
body part the biggest indicator of similarity or do they find skin color?) are in the
interaction between similarity and strength of ownership.

While the data is not significant enough to neither confirm nor deny the hypothesis,

the present study opens up several lines of future research and raise deeper questions on
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the role that one’s pre-existing identity has in experiencing induced body ownership

exercises. It is important that future studies recruit participants from a wide range of racial
groups such as what has been done in this study. Though there are previous studies who
have successfully altered IAT scores through the RHI, their all-White samples defeat the
purpose of using induced body ownership exercises outside of the laboratory. That is,

outside of the laboratory, populations are much more racially diverse and race is not as

easily quantified nor salient. In the future, analyzing the IAT scores of previous RHI studies
-- namely the studies who have recruited all-White samples, may also shed light on the

potential differences that exist between each race’s performance on the race IAT. Further

research should be done on the topic of manipulating implicit biases for non-White

individuals as this still appears to be a fairly unknown topic.

EMBODYING THE OTHER IN VIRTUAL REALITY

Tables
Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for IAT D-scores in Each Condition
Condition

Pre-induction
M

SD

Post-induction
M

SD

White hand

0.228

0.521

0.049

0.578

Black hand

0.108

0.461

0.121

0.487
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Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for Ownership Scores in Each Condition
Condition

M

SD

White hand

-0.938

0.973

Black hand

-0.688

1.001
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Figures

A

B

Figure 1. Experimental set-up of the virtual rubber hand illusion. Participants saw either
the Black (A) or White (B) pair of hands.
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A
B
Figure 2. Participant wearing the HTC Vive headset before undergoing the RHI simulation
(A) and position of experimenter and participant during the RHI simulation (B).
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Figure 3. Percentage of participants in each of the racial membership categories.

34

EMBODYING THE OTHER IN VIRTUAL REALITY

35

Appendix A
The 5 statements from the ‘Ownership’ portion of the Qualtrics questionnaire, adapted

from Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris (2013). Participants’ were asked to rate their

level of agreement towards the statements. Responses were then rated on a 5-point Likert
scale (+2 = ‘Strongly agree’, -2 = ‘Strongly disagree’).

During the experiment there were times when it seemed like…

1. I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than at a virtual hand.
2. The virtual hand was part of my body
3. The virtual hand was my band

4. The virtual hand belonged to me

5. The virtual hand began to resemble my real hand.
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